Tim Iacono

In John Hussman’s commentary this week he’s got another loan reset chart from Credit Suisse, this one peaking even later than the one that we’ve all been looking at since the onset of the subprime crisis back in 2007. In this one, things don’t really settle down until late-2012 instead of early that year.

Below is a slightly different schedule than we’ve seen. It doesn’t show the first round of sub-prime resets that ended in early 2009, and is based on different classifications, but is largely consistent with the overall profile we can anticipate.
I should note parenthetically that as you read reports about the mortgage and credit markets during the next few months, it will be extremely important to pay attention to the time period being discussed. For example, we are seeing articles with very recent datelines that are drawing conclusions based on relatively pleasant data from the fourth quarter of last year, which reflects the end of the reset lull that was completed with the low in September.

Yes, that’s probably good advice and it will be interesting to see what kind of a sales spurt develops between now and the end of April as mortgage rates begin to rise and the homebuyer tax credit expiration nears. It’s a pretty safe bet that this year’s housing data is not going to be nearly as “pleasant” as what was seen late last year.

The Market Ticker

You know it’s going to get good when LIESman says something like “there is a point in time when ignorance goes from being amusing to being dangerous” to a grizzled trader like Santelli.

Well, Liesman did, and…. (we’ll do facts after the video)

Now for the facts:

Any government can pump stock prices of insolvent institutions for a while by allowing them to lie on their balance sheets.  The poster child for this is, of course, Lehman brothers.  I reproduce for your edification a chart showing two quarterly reports during which Lehman was arguably insolvent (light gray) and then (in pink) a further period of time spanning more than a month when their counterparties knew they had no cash, yet FRBNY and The Fed, including but not limited to FRBNY, Paulson, Geithner and every other bank they dealt with knew they had no money. Yet their stock continued to trade, the company continued along, and Dick Fuld was on CNBS saying he was going to “burn the shorts.”

What was the outcome Steve?  Was it “all ok in the end” even though for a period of more than six months the stock continued to trade and in fact after that first report went up significantly?

What caused the collapse?  They ran out of cash flow.

Now about those other large banks and their balance sheets….

As a corollary to the above governments can also pump markets generally by replacing private demand in GDP with borrowing and spending, just as you can by using your credit card even though your income has been cut off.  This can and does lead to huge market rallies – for a while.  However, unless you can manage to increase credit in the system generally, meaning that private parties “come back” and take over from government, eventually the government becomes unable to sustain such a practice, just as you become unable to sustain such a practice.  In point of fact the government has borrowed and spent ten percent of GDP (in addition to all that it was spending before) for the last two years.  This has prevented the recognition of an economic depression in the “statistics” put forward by government, but that replacement of private demand is not, in fact, private demand! Thus you have unemployment and underemployment, even under the government’s statistics (among those who want jobs), hovering near one person in five in the economy, and only 60% of the labor force is actually working.  The other 40% of working-age, non-institutionalized people, are not working – which means they’re drawing on social programs of some sort.  This, of course, exacerbates the demand for the government to continue borrowing and spending that additional 10% of GDP.

What will cause this to collapse?  The same thing – recognition that the banks are in fact broke (and there are a bunch of them that are), inability to sell or roll over enough debt to satisfy the leaches in society, one of the rating agencies growing a pair of balls and downgrading the United States and more.  Indeed, a lockup in the credit markets could easily occur just as it did in 2008, and for the same reasons – a recognition that “heh that jackass over there has no good collateral!”

Can the government keep this from happening forever?  No.

Can it do so for “an extended period of time”?  Sure, but for exactly how long?

That’s the key, isn’t it?  We’re not running an 89% debt-to-GDP ratio, it’s in fact over 500%.  We’re lying just as Lehman was lying, but on a grader scale.  Yet when Rick Santelli brings this up, the pump monkeys go nuts.

Why?

Well gee, if you want to sell something to someone that is based on a fraudulent premise, how much luck will you have if the truth is exposed?

‘Nuff said.

The following article is adapted from a special report on “Popular Culture and the Stock Market” published by Robert Prechter, founder and CEO of the technical analysis and research firm Elliott Wave International. Although originally published in 1985, “Popular Culture and the Stock Market” is so timeless and relevant that USA Today covered its insights in a recent Nov. 2009 article. For the rest of this revealing 50-page report, download it for free here.

This year’s Academy Awards gave us movies about war (The Hurt Locker), football (The Blind Side), country music (Crazy Heart) and going native (Avatar), but nowhere did we see a horror movie nominated. In fact, it looks like Sweeney Todd, The Demon Barber of Fleet Street was the most recent to be nominated in 2008, for art direction (which it won), costume design and best actor, although the last one to win major awards for Best Picture, Director, Actor and Actress was The Silence of the Lambs in 1991.

Whether horror films win Academy Awards or not, they tell an interesting story about mass psychology. Research here at Elliott Wave International shows that horror films proliferate during bear markets, whereas upbeat, sweet-natured Disney movies show up during bull markets. Since the Dow has been in a bear-market rally for a year, now is not the time for horror films to dominate the movie theaters. But their time will come again.

In the meantime, to catch up on why all kinds of pop culture — including fashion, art, movies and music — can help to explain the markets, take a few minutes to read a piece called Popular Culture and the Stock Market, which Bob Prechter wrote in 1985. Here’s an excerpt about horror movies as a sample.

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From Popular Culture and the Stock Market by Bob Prechter

While musicals, adventures, and comedies weave into the pattern, one particularly clear example of correlation with the stock market is provided by horror movies. Horror movies descended upon the American scene in 1930-1933, the years the Dow Jones Industrials collapsed. Five classic horror films were all produced in less than three short years. Frankenstein and Dracula premiered in 1931, in the middle of the great bear market. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde played in 1932, the bear market bottom year and the only year that a horror film actor was ever granted an Oscar. The Mummy and King Kong hit the screen in 1933, on the double bottom. These are the classic horror films of all time, along with the new breed in the 1970s, and they all sold big. The message appeared to be that people had an inhuman, horrible side to them. Just to prove the vision correct, Hitler was placed in power in 1933 (an expression of the darkest public mood in decades) and fulfilled it. For thirteen years, lasting only slightly past the stock market bottom of 1942, films continued to feature Frankenstein monsters, vampires, werewolves and undead mummies. Ironically, Hollywood tried to introduce a new monster in 1935 during a bull market, but Werewolf of London was a flop. When film makers tried again in 1941, in the depths of a bear market, The Wolf Man was a smash hit.

Shortly after the bull market in stocks resumed in 1942, films abandoned dark, foreboding horror in the most sure-fire way: by laughing at it. When Abbott and Costello met Frankenstein, horror had no power. That decade treated moviegoers to patriotic war films and love themes. The 1950s gave us sci-fi adventures in a celebration of man’s abilities; all the while, the bull market in stocks raged on. The early 1960s introduced exciting James Bond adventures and happy musicals. The milder horror styles of the bull market years and the limited extent of their popularity stand in stark contrast to those of the bear market years.

Then a change hit. Just about the time the stock market was peaking, film makers became introspective, doubting and cynical. How far the change in cinematic mood had carried didn’t become fully clear until 1969-1970, when Night of the Living Dead and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre debuted. Just look at the chart of the Dow [not shown], and you’ll see the crash in mood that inspired those movies. The trend was set for the 1970s, as slice-and-dice horror hit the screen. There also appeared a rash of re-makes of the old Dracula and Frankenstein stories, but as a dominant theme, Frankenstein couldn’t cut it; we weren’t afraid of him any more.

Hollywood had to horrify us to satisfy us, and it did. The bloody slasher-on-the-loose movies were shocking versions of the ’30s’ monster shows, while the equally gory zombie films had a modern twist. In the 1930s, Dracula was a fitting allegory for the perceived fear of the day, that the aristocrat was sucking the blood of the common people. In the 1970s, horror was perpetrated by a group eating people alive, not an individual monster. An army of dead-but-moving flesh-eating zombies devouring every living person in sight was a fitting allegory for the new horror of the day, voracious government and the welfare state, and the pressures that most people felt as a result. The nature of late ’70s’ warfare ultimately reflected the mass-devouring visions, with the destruction of internal populations in Cambodia and China.

Learn what’s really behind trends in the stock market, music, fashion, movies and more… Read Robert Prechter’s Full 50-page Report, “Popular Culture and the Stock Market,” FREE

Courtesy of Relmor Demitrius

Sirius XM Radio (NASDAQ:SIRI) had a slew of news hit the newswires on Friday.  They were added to the NASDAQ Q-50 index and refinanced 800 million in restrictive debt.  First news reported was that Sirius XM was offering 550 million dollars in notes that would be used to repay their 2005 500 million dollar bond issue, at 9 5/8%.  This was welcome news to Sirius XM investors, as it took down a large bond maturity year of over 1.8 billion dollars in 2013 to 1.3 billion dollars.  This reinforces investors views that the company would no longer be caught like it did in 2009, with more debt due than could possible be paid off with cash on hand.  As reported last week by KOAT, we predicted that Sirius XM would be removing these exact bonds in a matter of maybe days.  This proved to be true.  Then the results of the offering came in later that day.

Instead of receiving 550 million dollars, due to strong demand for Sirius XM debt, they were able to raise 800 million dollars instead, a full 250 million dollars more than they originally asked for.  Due to the increased amount garnered from the offering, Sirius XM stated they would use the added money to remove a 2012 senior secured loan that had very restrictive bond covenants on them, and limited Sirius XM’s ability in their corporate structure or just general plans moving forward. More

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